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Discrimination Law and the Ebb and Flow of Indirect Effect in Britain  
 
 
Introduction 
 
British discrimination law has both national and European origins and thus has often 
been subject to the European doctrine of indirect effect.
1
  Indeed, a number of the 
leading cases on indirect effect have concerned discrimination law.
2
  The doctrine as 
laid down by the ECJ in Marleasing SA v Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion 
SA
3
 requires national legislation to be construed so far as possible to give effect to EU 
directives, whether or not the national legislation was designed to implement the 
directive.
4
  This interpretative obligation, with its reference to possibility, goes 
beyond merely following an EU-compliant construction when there are two equally 
possible alternatives, but generally not as far as allowing the directive to be followed 
outside national legislation – the latter being the preserve of directly effective EU 
                                                 
1
 ‘British’ (rather than UK) discrimination law is referred to here as Northern Ireland has its own 
distinct anti-discrimination legislation. 
2
 Such as Pickstone v Freemans [1989] AC 66 and Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1995] 1 WLR 1454, HL as 
well as the founding European case of Von Colson & Anor v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (C-14/83) 
[1986] 2 CMLR 430. 
3
 Marleasing SA v Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA (C-106/89) [1991] I-ECR 4135. 
4
 Lester (1993) described this case among others as causing our judges to act increasingly as a law-
makers: “Whether we and they like it or not, our judicial lions will have to move from their relatively 
sheltered position beneath the throne of the sovereign Queen in and outside Parliament”. 
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legislation.
5
  When seeking to synthesize particular provisions of EU and national 
law, the task for the national courts is to determine how much the words can tolerably 
bear and where to draw the line.
6
    
 
This article firstly outlines the approaches previously adopted by the House of Lords 
regarding the interpretative obligation, primarily in relation to British discrimination 
law, before going on to consider the more extreme example in Attridge Law v 
Coleman (where an entire subsection was read into an Act) and then some subsequent 
developments in both case law and legislation, concerning pregnancy discrimination 
and victimization.
7
  It will chart the various approaches to interpretation, will consider 
whether the high-water mark for judicial re-writing has been reached in Britain and 
will suggest that compliance with European law can otherwise be better attained. 
 
 
Background: The approach of the House of Lords in earlier cases 
 
                                                 
5
 This article focusses on indirect effect and the interpretative obligation and thus will not consider 
direct effect or Francovich claims for failure to give effect to EU legislation. 
6
 Marleasing took the obligation further than Von Colson (which concerned implementing legislation) 
but some later cases acknowledge that national courts will not always consider themselves able to come 
to a compliant construction (e.g. Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantia Salarial Case C-334/92 [1993] 
ECR I-6911; see further Craig and de Búrca, Steiner and Woods (2009) and Twigg-Flesner (2008)).  
See also Drake (2005).  
7
 In doing so it will inevitably have to refer to former pieces of discrimination law as well as the newer 
Equality Act 2010. 
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The analytic interpretation required by the Marleasing doctrine, outlined above, is not 
reserved to national legislation which, either explicitly or effectively, implements 
directives, but also extends to pieces of legislation that cover the same ground as 
directly effective treaty articles or regulations (as it is recognised that if national law 
can be read as complying with such European law there is no need to try to invoke the 
supremacy of the latter).
 8
  It is instructive to consider some of the leading authorities 
before going on to see how they have been applied.  The equal pay case of Pickstone v 
Freemans Plc
9
 is particularly instructive not only because it is an example of the 
wider use of indirect effect
10
 but also because of there being some divergence 
regarding the mode of interpretation.  In his speech, Lord Templeman noted that the 
House of Lords had, in the earlier sex discrimination case of Duke v Reliance Systems 
Ltd
11
  (which concerned a retirement provision that expressly conflicted with the 
ECJ’s interpretation of the Equal Pay Directive), “declined to distort the construction 
of an Act of Parliament which was not drafted to give effect to a Directive and which 
was not capable of complying with the Directive as subsequently construed by the 
                                                 
8
 As Lord Keith put it in Pickstone v Freemans [1989] AC 66, 112:  “In the circumstances it is 
unnecessary to consider the ground upon which the Court of Appeal found in favour of the 
respondents, namely that article 119 was directly enforceable in such a way as to enable their claim to 
be supported irrespective of the true construction of the Regulations of 1983.” 
9
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66. 
10
 The House of Lords unanimously (after some debate) interpreted national regulations amending the 
Equal Pay Act 1970 purposively so as to comply with both the source treaty obligation and the 
mischief that Parliament intended to remedy. 
11
 Duke v Reliance Systems Ltd [1988] AC 618. 
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European Court of Justice”.12  The situation in Pickstone, however, was very different 
as there was no clearly conflicting provision and he thus had 
 
“no difficulty in construing the Regulations of 1983 in a way which gives 
effect to the declared intention of the Government of the United Kingdom 
responsible for drafting the Regulations and is consistent with the objects of 
the E.E.C. Treaty, the provisions of the Equal Pay Directive and the rulings of 
the European Court of Justice.”13   
 
Lord Oliver, by contrast, originally considered that the wording was not ambiguous 
and that a literal interpretation would conflict with European law.  However, he came 
to the view that as these regulations were passed to give effect to European 
obligations under the European Communities Act 1972 they fell into a “special 
category” for interpretation and, with that in mind, that they were reasonably capable 
of bearing a meaning which would not put the United Kingdom in breach of its Treaty 
                                                 
12
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 123.  Lord Diplock in Garland v British Rail Engineering 
Ltd [1983] 2 AC 751 had noted the trite law regarding international treaty obligations that later 
legislation is to be construed, if it is reasonably capable of bearing such a meaning, as being intended to 
comply with the obligation and mooted the possibility EC law may require more (at 771).  Lord 
Templeman in Duke, having had advantage of full argument (not available to Lord Diplock) held that 
the provision in question in both was not designed to implement EC law and that Lord Diplock’s 
proposition did not “enable or constrain a British court to distort the meaning of a British statute in 
order to enforce against an individual a Community directive which has no direct effect between 
individuals” (at 639-640). 
13
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 123. 
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obligation.
14
  This would be done not so much by “doing violence to the language of 
the section as filling a gap by an implication which arises, not from the words used, 
but from the manifest purpose of the Act and the mischief it was intended to 
remedy”.15  Such construction could then be either that adopted by Lord Templeman 
or through reading in to the regulations a seven word parenthetic phrase.
16
  Lord Keith 
considered, pragmatically, that some implication may be necessary but that “[t]he 
precise terms of that implication do not seem to me to matter” and that it was 
sufficient to construe the words purposively.
17
  The remaining Law Lords on the 
panel, Lord Brandon and Lord Jauncey, concurred with all three.
18
   
                                                 
14
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 126. 
15
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 125. 
16
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 126; the read in or inserted words being ‘(in respect of the 
man hereinafter mentioned)’ so that s.1(2)(c) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 would be read as holding 
“where a woman is employed on work which, not being work in relation to which (in respect of the 
man hereinafter mentioned) paragraph (a) or (b) above applies, is, in terms of the demands made on her 
(for instance under such headings as effort, skill and decision), of equal value to that of a man in the 
same employment”. 
17
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 112.  In Webb v Emo Air Cargo (U.K.) Ltd. (No. 2) [1995] 
1 WLR 1454 (a pregnancy discrimination case), Lord Keith felt able to construe the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 so as to comply with the EC law, following a reference to the ECJ, in a very short and 
ambiguous speech.  Unfortunately, the other Lords on that panel merely agreed.  Given its brevity it 
will not be considered here beyond to say that while their lordships did not explain their reasoning in 
terms it would appear that they interpreted section 5(3) – which held that “A comparison of the cases of 
persons of different sex… must be such that the relevant circumstances in the one case are the same or 
not materially different, in the other” – as capable of being read as saying that if a dismissed woman 
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The same panel of the House of Lords again considered the interpretation of 
regulations, this time intended to give effect to a directive (the ‘Acquired Rights 
Directive’),19 in the non-discrimination case of Litster and Others v Forth Dry Dock 
& Engineering Co. Ltd. (In Receivership) and Another.
20
  As in Pickstone, there were 
national regulations which were intended to give effect to European law, and as in 
Pickstone, the wording of a provision allowed (or arguably, viewed literally, 
mandated) an interpretation which meant they could be readily evaded.  The 
regulation at issue protected the rights of employees when their business was 
transferred and in doing so referred to those “so employed immediately before the 
transfer”, which on a literal interpretation could exclude those dismissed one minute 
before the transfer.  Using the precedent of Pickstone, their Lordships held that words 
could be implied into the regulation so as to fill the lacuna and achieve a construction 
consistent with European community law.  Lord Keith, in his short concurring speech, 
took a more emphatic view of Pickstone than he had in the case itself holding that 
 
on a literal reading the regulation particularly relevant did not succeed in 
completely filling the lacuna. Your Lordships' House, however, held that in 
                                                                                                                                            
was dismissed because she was pregnant, and as a man cannot be pregnant, therefore she must have 
been discriminated against because of her sex. 
18
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 112 and 128. 
19
 Council Directive 77/187/EEC. 
20
 Litster and Others v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (In Receivership) and Another [1990] 1 
AC 546. 
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order that the manifest purpose of the Regulations might be achieved and 
effect given to the clear but inadequately expressed intention of Parliament 
certain words must be read in by necessary implication.
21
 
 
The words implied in Litster were to add “or would have been so employed if he had 
not been unfairly dismissed in the circumstances described in regulation 8(1)”22 
following the regulation’s reference to being “so employed immediately before the 
transfer”.  While the number of words inserted is not insignificant, it is a common 
sense decision and clearly gives effect to the underlying purpose – as Lord Keith put 
it, without the implication “a coach and four would have been driven through the 
provisions”.23  It is not the number of words, but the underlying purpose which is the 
key issue; something which Lord Rodger noted some years later in his review of 
authorities in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza.
24
  Expressly drawing an analogy with 
Housman’s advice on the sound emendation of corrupt text, Lord Rodger considered 
that the key to what is legitimate lies in a careful consideration of the principles and 
scope of the legislation:   
 
                                                 
21
 Litster Others v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (In Receivership) and Another [1990] 1 AC 
546, 584. 
22
 Litster Others v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (In Receivership) and Another [1990] 1 AC 
546, 577. 
23
 Indeed the phrasing has come to be enshrined verbatim by Parliament in the successor regulations, 
Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006/246 reg. 4(3). 
24
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557. 
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If the insertion of one word contradicts those principles or goes beyond the 
scope of the legislation, it amounts to impermissible amendment. On the other 
hand, if the implication of a dozen words leaves the essential principles and 
scope of the legislation intact but allows it to be read in a way which is 
compatible with Convention rights, the implication is a legitimate exercise... 
25
 
 
While Ghaidan, a landlord and tenant case, involved the interpretative obligation 
under section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the House of Lords treated the 
ECHR and EC situations as analogous
26
 and as the case is much cited in EBR Attridge 
Law LLP & Anor v Coleman
27
 (considered in detail below) and other cases it makes 
sense to briefly outline the case here.  In Ghaidan the courts were concerned with the 
interpretation of the word ‘spouse’ within provisions of the Rent Act 1977 dealing 
with statutory tenants by succession.  While it could hardly be thought that the 
legislators intended to include homosexual partners within the provision back in 1977, 
it was nonetheless possible to read the term spouse so as not to conflict with Article 8 
and 14 ECHR rights, not least, according to the leading speech of Lord Nicholls, 
                                                 
25
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [122]. 
26
 See e.g. Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [48], [118].  Ghaidan was applied by the CA 
in an EC context in HMRC v IDT Card Services Ireland Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 29.  For more on 
interpretation under the ECHR see, e.g., Marshall (2003) and Sales and Ekins (2011).  Sales and Ekins 
hold that, in English law, the boundary between ECHR-compliant interpretation and when to make a 
declaration of incompatibility is the thing “which brings most acutely into focus the issue of the proper 
respective functions of the legislature and the courts” (at 217).  This article contends that when and 
how to use indirect effect also brings the issue sharply into focus. 
27
 [2010] ICR 242. 
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given the history of changes to the provision (with widowers having been accorded a 
privileged position regarding succession in 1980 and the survivor of a cohabiting 
heterosexual couple being treated in the same way as a spouse of the original tenant 
from 1988).
28
  In the words of Lord Rodger, such an interpretation goes “with the 
grain”29 of the Act as the underlying rationale is the same, it would not contradict any 
cardinal principle of the Act and it would reflect that society has moved on since the 
provision was last amended.
30
  In the somewhat more colourful language of Buxton 
LJ in the Court of Appeal, “Parliament having swallowed the camel of including 
unmarried partners within the protection given to married couples, it is not for this 
court to strain at the gnat of including such partners who are of the same sex as each 
other”.31  In Ghaidan, no great insertion of words was necessary, it being arguably a 
fairly simple matter of interpretation in light of changing mores (with Baroness Hale 
declaring that it was “not even a marginal case”).32  This was not the case, however, in 
EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman,
33
 which saw an entire sub-section read, or 
written, in by the EAT. 
 
 
                                                 
28
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557, [14]; Antonio Mendoza v Ahmad Raja Ghaidan [2002] 
EWCA Civ 1533 at [35] per Buxton LJ.   
29
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [121]; the phrasing is cited with approval by Lord 
Nicholls at [33]. 
30
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [128]. 
31
 Antonio Mendoza v Ahmad Raja Ghaidan [2002] EWCA Civ 1533 at [35]. 
32
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [144]. 
33
 Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman [2010] ICR 242. 
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Extreme judicial drafting in EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman  
 
Attridge Law revolved around the scope of both the Disability Discrimination Act 
1995 (DDA) and Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a 
general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.  Ms Coleman 
started working for Attridge Law as a legal secretary in 2001.  The following year she 
gave birth to a disabled son.  (The disability, being the suffering of apnoeic attacks 
and congenital laryngomalacia and bronchomalacia, necessitated specialised and 
particular caring, with Ms Coleman being his principal carer.)  On the assumed facts 
of the preliminary case, Ms Coleman was, inter alia, not allowed to return to the same 
position as she held before, was denied the same flexibility as regards working hours 
and conditions as offered to other parents (of non-disabled children), was described as 
lazy when she requested time off to care for her son (whereas other parents were 
allowed time off), was subject to abusive and insulting comments and was threatened 
with dismissal if she came to work late again because of her son’s condition.  She 
accepted voluntary redundancy in 2005 and then sought to bring a claim for disability 
discrimination, disability-related discrimination and disability harassment, her 
resignation having been a response to that treatment.  However, for all three claims 
the DDA used the claimant-specific formulation (as also used with regard to direct 
discrimination in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Employment Equality 
(Age)  Regulations 2006) rather than the wider formulation adopted in the Race 
Relations Act 1976 and the other employment equality regulations which allowed for 
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claims based on another’s characteristic (‘associative discrimination’).34  Thus under 
the express wording of the DDA the less favourable treatment or harassment needed 
to be related to, or on the grounds of, ‘the disabled person’s disability’, and the 
complainant had to be that disabled person. 
 
Whether or not Council Directive 2000/78/EC (the ‘Framework Directive’) extended 
to cover associative discrimination was not clear and the matter was referred to the 
ECJ by the tribunal, who duly decided that, while the directive did not directly 
address the matter, “an interpretation of Directive 2000/78 limiting its application 
only to people who are themselves disabled is liable to deprive that Directive of an 
important element of its effectiveness and to reduce the protection which it is intended 
to guarantee” (the underlying principles of the directive being concerned with 
recognising the worth of every individual, their ability to develop their sense of 
dignity and self-respect and their ability to exercise their autonomy).
35
  That 
interpretation of the directive was sufficient for Employment Judge Stacey, at the 
                                                 
34
 See e.g. Weathersfield Ltd v Sargent [1999] ICR 425, CA building on, inter alia, Race Relations 
Board v Applin [1975] AC 259 in holding that less favourable treatment on ‘racial grounds’ need not 
involve the complainant’s own race.  The employment equality regulations are the Employment 
Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 – which expressly makes clear that the ground need not 
be the complainant’s – and the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 which 
follows the principle in Weathersfield (English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd [2009] ICR 543, CA).  For the 
sake of completeness, it should be noted that from its inception the Employment Equality (Age) 
Regulations 2006 adopted the associative approach with regard to harassment (as opposed to direct 
discrimination) as did the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 following an amendment in 2008. 
35
 Coleman v Attridge Law (Case C-303/06) [2008] 3 CMLR 27. 
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tribunal, to hold that the DDA could be interpreted so as to comply with European law 
through the insertion of such words as “or a person associated with a disabled person” 
whenever the relevant provisions (sections 3A, 3B and 4) referred to ‘the disabled 
person’.  On appeal to the EAT, Underhill P echoed both Lord Keith in Pickstone36 
and Lord Nicholls in Ghaidan
37
 in stating that it is not necessary to draft precisely the 
implied words, but he nevertheless went on to do so.  Rather than follow Employment 
Judge Stacey’s more economical but flawed approach (which peculiarly referred to 
the abilities of the associated person rather than the disabled person when making the 
comparison necessary in a discrimination claim), he preferred to purport to insert two 
new sub-sections, s.3A(5A) and s.3B(3) (as well as make smaller amendments 
referring to those subsections) holding that with regard to direct discrimination, for 
example:  
 
I would thus, if I were re-drafting the statute to give effect to the reasoning of 
the Court, add to s. 3A a sub-section (5A) in the following terms: 
(5A) A person also directly discriminates against a person if he treats him 
less favourably than he treats or would treat another person by reason of 
the disability of another person. ... 
 
(with s.3B(3) extending harassment in similar fashion).
38
  
 
                                                 
36
 Pickstone v Freemans Plc [1989] AC 66, 112. 
37
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [35]. 
38
 EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman [2010] ICR 242 at [15]. 
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This formulation does not refer to, and arguably is not confined to, association, and in 
applying a general test goes much further than the ECJ’s judgment which made it 
clear that their answer to the referred question specifically related to the cases of an 
employee who is the carer of a disabled child.
39
  While it may be going too far to 
describe this as ‘judicial vandalism’40 to an already much amended piece of 
legislation, as it does not negative an explicit provision, both the content and the 
format (in creating virtual new numbered subsections) appear to push the 
interpretative obligation to the limit and, indeed, towards horizontal direct effect.  
Unlike in Pickstone, there was no ambiguity; unlike Litster, this did not fill an 
otherwise absurd lacuna and unlike in Ghaidan it does not involve a straight-forward 
interpretation in light of changing mores; instead it introduced a concept into the Act 
which was not intended by legislature or government (or, in terms, as was 
acknowledged by Underhill P, by the ECJ).  Arden LJ has written that  
 
Even if the court comes to the conclusion that [EU law] requires it to adopt its 
own conforming interpretation, that is, an interpretation which is not the 
natural interpretation but which is required to make the provision compatible 
                                                 
39
 Coleman v Attridge Law (Case C-303/06) [2008] 3 CMLR 27 at [56]. 
40
 To adopt Lord Bingham’s phrase in R (on the app. of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2002] UKHL 46 at [30] (‘To read section 29 as precluding participation by the Home Secretary, if it 
were possible to do so, would not be judicial interpretation but judicial vandalism: it would give the 
section an effect quite different from that which Parliament intended and would go well beyond any 
interpretative process sanctioned by section 3 of the 1998 Act …"). 
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with Convention rights or Community law, it may well find in the deeper 
layers of the legislation a seam of material to assist it.
41
  
 
No such material existed in Attridge.  The difference between ‘spouse’ and ‘civil 
partner’ is far smaller than that between the disability of the claimant and the 
disability ‘of another person’.  In Ghaidan the interpretation went ‘with the grain of 
the Act’, whereas in Attridge it inserted a new and distinct plank.  The Marleasing 
obligation is to interpret national law, so far as possible, in the light of the wording 
and the purpose of the directive,
42
 but there must come a time when the text is strained 
so much that possible interpretation becomes judicial legislation.   
 
Associative discrimination has been an accepted part of Race Discrimination in 
Britain since Showboat Entertainment Centre Ltd v Owens [1984] ICR 65 and 
Weathersfield Ltd v Sargent
43
 as well as being part of the newer grounds of sexual 
orientation and religion or belief
44
 but, at that time, it had not been part of direct 
discrimination relating to sex, age or, hitherto, disability.  Underhill P, in forming his 
view, considered that the conclusion reached in the race cases of Showboat and 
                                                 
41
 Arden (2008, 507). 
42
 See also Pfeiffer (Social policy) [2004] ECR 8835.  This case predated Kücükdeveci v Swedex GMBH 
[2010] IRLR 346 which, as is noted later, suggested that there could be judicial deletion of words 
which prevent a directive-compliant interpretation. 
43
 [1999] ICR 425, CA. 
44
 By analogy with the Race Relations Act 1976 as regards Sexual Orientation and through explicit 
phrasing in the Religion or Belief Regulations. 
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Weathersfield  “confirms that as a matter of UK law the policy underlying the anti-
discrimination legislation applies to associative discrimination as much as to 
‘primary’ discrimination” and went on to state that he could “see no reason why there 
should be a different policy as regards disability discrimination and no reason to 
suppose that the choice to draft by reference to ‘a disabled person’ reflected a 
deliberate and different policy judgment”.45  This ignores the fact that sex and age 
also adopted the claimant specific formulation and, indeed, that when the 
Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 were laid the explanatory notes 
declared that the narrower approach as regards direct discrimination had been used 
deliberately.
46
  Furthermore, in the government’s Discrimination Law Review, it was 
proposed to keep the then approach for both sex and age discrimination; in the case of 
the former because a change would be of no practical benefit and in the case of the 
latter because “[e]xtending the definition to include association could potentially 
bring in parents, carers, teachers, dependants and many others, taking the legislation 
far beyond its intended scope”.47  It was also proposed that disability discrimination 
should remain the same, since to introduce associative discrimination would 
“significantly extend the responsibilities of those with duties under the legislation” 
                                                 
45
 EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman [2010] ICR 242 at [14]. 
46
 Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006 Notes on Regulations, para 9 (available online: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060924231655/dti.gov.uk/files/file27136.pdf; accessed 30 
April 2013).  NB this is a different document to the Explanatory Memoranda to the Regulations which 
accompany the regulations on ww.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2006/1031/made and which provide some 
background to policy rather than the notes’ regulation-by-regulation commentary. 
47
 Dept of Communities and Local Government (2007). 
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and be disproportionate, though they noted that the then pending ECJ decision in 
Attridge Law could require them to review the matter.   
 
While all the foregoing is non-statutory, there is, furthermore, some legislative 
indication that the unambiguous wording in the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 
was deliberately narrow, as can be seen in both section 4(5) of the pre-1
st
 October 
2004 version of the DDA 1995 and section 55(5) of the post-1
st
 October 2004 version 
of the Act. These stated respectively i) that “[i]n the case of an act which constitutes 
discrimination by virtue of section 55 [Victimisation], this section also applies to 
discrimination against a person who is not disabled” and ii) that “[i]n the case of an 
act which constitutes discrimination by virtue of this section [section 55], sections 4, 
4B,… also apply to discrimination against a person who is not disabled”.  To hold that 
the phrase “disabled person” can include those associated with a disabled person is to 
render such sub-sections from whichever version utterly purposeless.  Although 
Underhill P noted that Ms Coleman’s claims related to acts or omissions after 1st 
October 2004 and he recites section 55 among the relevant provisions, he does not 
include any reference to section 55(5).
48
   
 
In coming to his ultimate conclusion, Underhill P peremptorily dismissed the dicta 
(detailed below) of Burton J in Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry (‘EOC’),49 and the approval of it by Laws LJ in English v 
                                                 
48
 EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman [2010] ICR 242 at [4] (while s.55(1)-s.55(4) are laid out 
in that paragraph of the judgment there is no mention of s.55(5) or the predecessor s.4(5)). 
49
 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327. 
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Thomas Sanderson Ltd,
50
 stating that those judgments “are no more than conclusions, 
right or wrong, on the particular problem in those cases: they do not add to the 
guidance to be found in Ghaidan”.51  In EOC, Burton J had declined to interpret 
section 4A(1)(a) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which read “on the ground of 
her sex, he engages in unwanted conduct that has the purpose or effect of violating…” 
as reading “he engages in unwanted conduct that has the purpose or effect on the 
ground of her sex of violating...” as he considered that to do so was not  
 
“appropriate – by virtue of the extent of reading down/transposition which 
would be required to be considered in order to render them compliant: or 
possible - because I am not persuaded that even such extreme application of 
the Marleasing principle would in any event be effective: or sensible – 
because of the need for clarity and certainty, and comprehensibility, by 
employees and employers alike.”52 
 
Attridge Law could thus be seen to represent the high water mark of judicial 
interpretation given both the preceding cases discussed above and subsequent 
                                                 
50
 English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 1421 at [33]. 
51
 EBR Attridge Law LLP & Anor v Coleman [2010] ICR 242 at [20]. 
52
 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327 at 
[61]. 
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judgments of both the Scottish EAT (in Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish & Ors)
53
 and 
of the English and Welsh EAT (in the albeit contradictory cases of Rowstock v Ltd v 
Jessemey
54
 and Akwiwu & Anor v Onu)
55
 which are discussed below; as is the later 
appeal in Rowstock, where Underhill LJ has continued his practice of inserting 
subsections.   
 
 
Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish: Attridge Law distinguished and problems with 
the Equality Act 2010 
 
Kulikaoskas saw the question of associative discrimination move on to the 
characteristic of pregnancy/maternity.  Ms Mihailova and Mr Kulikaoskas were 
partners and were employed by MacDuff Shellfish for less than a month before being 
dismissed and both brought claims for sex/pregnancy discrimination under the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975.  In his claim form, Mr Kulikaoskas stated that his partner’s 
pregnancy was the cause for the less favourable treatment, the dismissal being a 
response to his informing his supervisor that she was pregnant when questioned as to 
why he was helping her lift heavy weights.   The claim form was not accepted by the 
Employment Tribunal and he appealed to the EAT where Lady Smith, working on the 
                                                 
53
 [2011] ICR 48 (the case went to appeal to the Court of Session who referred a question on 
interpretation to the ECJ on January 30, 2012 (Case C-44/12; 2012/C 109/10) but this was withdrawn 
in November 2012 (2013/C 108/43). 
54
 Rowstock v Ltd v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 (05 March 2013). 
55
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 (1 May 2013). 
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assumption that Mr Kulikaoskas’s statements were true, dismissed the appeal as a 
matter of law.   
 
The provision subject to interpretation was section 3A(1) of the SDA 1975 which 
stated “a person discriminates against a woman if – (a) at a time [between becoming 
pregnant and the end of her maternity leave], and on the ground of the woman’s 
pregnancy, the person treats her less favourably…” and it was common ground that 
on a plain reading the claimant had no case.  The dispute was over whether European 
law required that plain reading to be subject to purposive interpretation or extension.   
Section 3A had been inserted into the SDA 1975 in an attempt to comply with the 
Equal Treatment Amendment Directive 2002/73/EC (regarding equality between men 
and women) although pregnancy had for some years already fallen within sex 
discrimination following a series of ECJ cases.
56
  The inserted section had been 
slightly recast in 2008, it having been found in a further strand of the EOC case that 
the new section impermissibly included a requirement for a comparator (a non-
pregnant woman) contrary to both the directive and the pre-existing case law.
57
   
                                                 
56
 Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jonge Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus [1991] IRLR 27, 
ECJ; Webb v EMO Air Cargo [1994] 2 CMLR 729; Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og 
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund i Danmark (HK), acting on behalf of Brandt-Nielsen [2001] IRLR 
853, ECJ.  The abbreviation ECJ is used here as it was the predominant abbreviation for the court 
during the time of these cases; the court under the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty on European Union 
refer to the court as the Court of Justice, e.g. ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union includes the 
Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts’ (Article 19(1) of the EU Treaty). 
57
 Equal Opportunities Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327 at 
[63].  Originally the extract from s.3A(1)(a) SDA 1975 quoted above continued “…than he would treat 
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The European derivation of the provision was thus clear but Lady Smith distinguished 
the case from that of Ms Coleman in both the ECJ and the subsequent EAT decision.  
The relevant directives in Kulikaoskas were the Equal Treatment Directives (ETD)
58
 
and the Pregnant Workers Directive
59
 rather than the Framework Directive.  While the 
Framework Directive was silent as to associative discrimination (although, as 
mentioned above, with underlying principles requiring it to be covered), the ETD 
provision was not only part of a ‘separate code’ – which rather than being concerned 
with issues of diminishing autonomy or general respect
60
 sought to provide special 
support and protection for pregnancy and maternity – but its wording militates against 
associative discrimination; article 2(2) differentiating between ‘persons’ (for the 
broader sex-based claims) and ‘a woman’ (for pregnancy/maternity discrimination).61  
Accordingly, Lady Smith declined to consider how far the ECJ or EAT decisions in 
Attridge could be extended, beyond potentially allowing someone other than a 
disabled person to claim disability discrimination, but did note the evident importance 
given by the ECJ to the fact that Ms Coleman was the primary carer (rather than mere 
                                                                                                                                            
her had she not become pregnant”.  Counsel for the EOC preferred the EC’s use of ‘unfavourably’ 
rather than less favourably (at [47]), and the Equality Act 2010 adopts that formulation (ss.17, 18). 
58
 Council Directives 76/207, 2002/73/EC, and 2006/54/EC. 
59
 Council Directive 92/85/EC. 
60
 [2011] ICR 48 at [37], [38]. 
61
 Lady Smith noted that “It would have been a simple matter to provide that discrimination covered 
any less favourable treatment of “persons in relation to a woman’s pregnancy” if that was what had 
been intended”, [2011] ICR 48 at [37]. 
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association).
62
  She thus did not accept the Claimant’s proposed ‘insertion’ of a new 
sub-section into section 3A SDA 1975 allowing associative discrimination
63
 and 
considered that were such an interpretation to be adopted it would be hard to see how, 
in two vivid examples, a priest dismissed on grounds of the pregnancy of a nun with 
whom he had a sexual relationship, or a teacher dismissed on grounds of the 
pregnancy of a pupil with whom he had a sexual relationship, could be excluded from 
having a claim.
64
  Lady Smith also declined counsel for the claimant’s invocation of 
the Equality Act 2010 on grounds that the wording of the provisions “was not entirely 
clear and, further, there seemed to be no question of the statute having retrospective 
effect”.65  Indeed, while pregnancy/maternity is now listed as one of the nine 
protected characteristics in section 4 of the Equality Act 2010 the drafting of the Act 
suggests that there may now be no direct discrimination claim for 
pregnancy/maternity let alone an associative one.  Whilst the direct discrimination 
provision does not exclude any of the protected characteristics from its scope (unlike 
indirect discrimination and harassment which explicitly exclude 
pregnancy/maternity), a later section – section 25 – does explicitly set out what is 
meant by the nine discriminations (for example “Age discrimination is— (a) 
discrimination within section 13 because of age; (b) discrimination within section 19 
                                                 
62
 Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish & Ors [2011] ICR 48 at [19]. 
63
 Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish & Ors [2011] ICR 48 at [24]: ‘(1A) A person also directly 
discriminates against a person if he treats him less favourably than he treats or would treat another 
person by reason of the pregnancy or maternity leave of another person.” 
64
 Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish & Ors [2011] ICR 48 at [34]. 
65
 Kulikaoskas v MacDuff Shellfish & Ors [2011] ICR 48 at [25]. 
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where the relevant protected characteristic is age”) and for maternity/pregnancy 
discrimination it solely refers to the special provisions in sections 17 and 18 which 
expressly refer to the complainant in a clear contradistinction to the ‘harmonised’ 
direct discrimination provision. 
 
 
Victimisation and further problems with the Equality Act 2010 
 
Problems with the drafting and construction of the Equality Act 2010 were further to 
the fore in two cases where judgment was given within two months of each other, 
Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey
66
 and Akwiwu & Anor v Onu.
67
  Taking Rowstock first, the 
facts were as follows.  Mr Jessemey, a car repairer, had been dismissed by Rowstock 
around his 66
th
 birthday as they did not wish to employ men over 65.  They failed to 
comply with the (then) statutory retirement procedures and conceded the unfairness of 
the dismissal but Mr Jessemey also claimed compensation for post-employment 
victimisation due to a poor reference which he claimed was given due to his initiating 
tribunal proceedings.  The Employment Tribunal accepted that the poor reference had 
                                                 
66
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503. 
67
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105. The facts of the case (exploitation of 
Nigerian migrant domestic worker) do not add anything to this discussion and predominantly relate to 
the separate question of the fundamental nature of direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation 
being a subsidiary point in the case.  Indeed, it was heard alongside the appeal in Taiwo v Olaigbe 
[2013] UKEAT 0254_12_0503 which was solely on this wider point and not the victimisation issue 
mentioned above.   
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been given because of the proceedings but found that they had no power to award a 
remedy given the wording of the victimisation provisions within the Equality Act 
2010.  He appealed to the EAT (which also heard a cross-appeal by Rowstock on a 
separate point concerning a reduction in damages). 
 
It has been a matter of EU law since 1998 that victimisation (broadly speaking less 
favourable treatment suffered as a result of doing something in connection with 
discrimination legislation) could apply to things done after the end of the employment 
relationship.
68
  The House of Lords in 2003 accepted this point regarding both 
victimisation and other forms of harassment in Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group Plc
69
 
and Parliament that year serially legislated for such post-termination events (in the  
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Employment 
Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and through amendments to the 
existing legislation).
70
  These provisions were replaced by section 108 of the Equality 
Act 2010.  This ‘similar’ provision, to quote the Explanatory Notes, also extended the 
coverage to non-employment related religion or belief, sexual orientation and age 
                                                 
68
 Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd (C-185/97) [1998] 3 CMLR 958; for more on the history of 
victimisation see Middlemiss (2012). 
69
 Rhys-Harper v Relaxion Group Plc [2003] UKHL 33. 
70
 S.27A Race Relations Act 1976 inserted by Reg. 29 Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendments) 
Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1626; S.20A Sex Discrimination Act 1975 inserted by Reg. 3 Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1657; S.16A Disability 
Discrimination Act 1995 inserted by Reg. 15 Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (Amendment) 
Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1673.  These are inaccurately all cited to SI 2003/1673 in Rowstock ([2012] 
UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [21]). 
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discrimination.  However, another novation is that in section 108(7) it explicitly states 
“But conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to 
victimisation of B by A”.  Unless there was some other means allowing claims for 
post-employment victimisation, the UK would appear to be non-compliant with the 
EU law following a “legislative blunder” (in the words of Counsel) or the, highly 
likely unintentional, introduction of a lacuna (as found by the EAT).
71
  The 
complainant adopted the intervening Equality and Human Rights Commission’s 
“particularly broad approach to the task of statutory construction and/or 
interpretation” to attempt to win his claim and render actual legislative amendment 
unnecessary,
72
 citing among other cases Attridge where Underhill P, in the words of 
the EAT, stepped “beyond the strict limits of domestic principles of statutory 
construction – in order to read words into legislation in order to achieve conformity 
with Community law”.73  The main authority, relied on by all sides, however, was 
Ghaidan. 
 
As mentioned above, in his leading speech, Lord Nicholls stated that “[w]ords implied 
must, in the phrase of my noble and learned friend Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, 'go with 
the grain of the legislation'”.  His lordship continued “[t]here may be several ways of 
making a provision Convention-compliant, and the choice may involve issues calling 
                                                 
71
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [26] and [29]. 
72
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [14] and [27]. 
73
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [32]; Kücükdeveci v Swedex GMBH [2010] 
IRLR 346 was also noted. 
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for legislative deliberation”.74  The EAT eschewed the approach taken by 
Employment Judge Tsamados (sitting alone) in Taiwo v Olagigbe
75
 as defining 
employment as including ‘current and/or former’ employment when interpreting the 
Equality Act 2010 as to follow such a “tempting” approach would lead to an 
incomplete recasting of the Act as section 108 applies to many other relationships 
(such as the provision of goods and services but also such more analogous 
relationships as partners, contract workers, etc.).
76
  Furthermore, the presence of an 
express exception in section 108(7), meant that in Rowstock “no judicial tool is 
available to make available a remedy which the words used by Parliament have 
simply stated shall not be available”.77  Indeed, in stark contradistinction to Rhys-
Harper v Relaxion Group Plc where the courts could extrapolate remedies to fill an 
unconsidered point, in Rowstock the EAT were “being invited to hold that [section 
108(7)] means the exact reverse of what it says” and they unanimously refused to read 
“is not” as meaning “is also”.78  Citing Ghaidan, they refused to cross the “Rubicon 
                                                 
74
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] 2 AC 557 at [33]. 
75
Taiwo v Olagigbe unreported (ET case number 2389629/2011). 
76
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [34]. 
77
 Rowstock [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [39]. 
78
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [36] – [38].  Kavannagh (2009) criticises 
Ewing and Tham (2008) in another context for, in her words, holding the view that if “courts interpret 
statutory wording in a way which departs from what those words are ‘thought to mean in ordinary 
standard language’, they must be guilty of arbitrary linguistic manipulation of Humpty Dumpty 
proportions’ and reminds us that purposive interpretation enjoins courts to depart from ordinary 
meanings to advance the purpose (at 297).  However, this case at least cannot be held to such a charge 
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which the courts may not cross” (per Lord Steyn at [49]).  While Underhill P in 
Attridge found a pathway illuminated by Ghaidan which allowed an EU law 
compliant result, the EAT with the advantage of a full tribunal found themselves 
“unable to hold that the pathway can be followed by us to produce such a result in the 
instant case”.79 
 
Two months later, in Akwiwu & Anor v Onu,
80
 an EAT led by Langstaff P (and with 
one common member) disagreed with the decision in Rowstock primarily as a matter 
of national law.  While they were “troubled by both the exact meaning and purpose of 
Subsection (7)” and noted that the “provision is not explicit” and litotically “not 
entirely easy to discern”,81 they concluded that section 108(7) could only make sense 
if the draftsman had assumed that there could be some other way that post-termination 
                                                                                                                                            
as to hold words as meaning the direct opposite surely goes beyond interpretation and into the world of 
Lewis Carroll. 
79
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [38].  While there was a mistake in the Act, 
the express contradictory wording would mean that any remedy should be sought against the 
government under Francovich rather than the ex-employers (see also Burton J Equal Opportunities 
Commission v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2007] IRLR 327 regarding the importance of 
clarity, certainty and comprehensibility for employees and employers, at [61]. 
80
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105. The facts of the case (exploitation of 
Nigerian migrant domestic worker) do not add anything to this discussion and predominantly relate to 
the separate question of the fundamental nature of direct and indirect discrimination, victimisation 
being a subsidiary point in the case.  Indeed, it was heard alongside the appeal in Taiwo v Olaigbe 
[2013] UKEAT 0254_12_0503 which was solely on this wider point and not the victimisation issue 
mentioned above.   
81
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [73], [83] and [75] respectively. 
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victimisation could be subject to a claim (as otherwise the restriction would serve no 
purpose).
82
  In doing so, they dismissed the proposition that ‘insofar as it also’ could 
be taken to mean ‘furthermore’ and thus act as an express exclusion of victimisation 
from being compensable post-termination (as interpreted in Rowstock).  Instead, they 
considered that it had to be read as saying that if there is victimisation present then 
there is no claim for harassment or discrimination under this section with any claim 
being recoverable under a separate victimisation provision and the section thus 
prevents double recovery.  The fact that there is no separate victimisation provision 
caused them to invoke Rhys-Harper and declare that the reasoning there applied to the 
definition of employee for victimisation purposes nothwithstanding that the section 
effectively codified Rhys-Harper for discrimination and harassment.
83
   
 
This disparate treatment of the various types of claim caused the Tribunal “some 
hesitation” but they decided that their lacuna would be much smaller than that left by 
the other interpretation.
84
  There was, however, no consideration of the concern 
regarding incomplete recasting raised in Rowstock mentioned above.  While not 
needing to use it as an interpretative aid, the EAT in Akwiwu drew comfort from the 
                                                 
82
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [76] – [77], [81]; the case is further 
complicated by the original ‘protected act’, giving rise to the victimisation claim, was done under the 
Race Relations Act 1976.  If the victimisation claim had fallen under the old Act there would have been 
no debate but as the victimising occurred within the first few months of the Equality Act it applied by 
virtue of Art.8 of The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No. 4, Savings, Consequential, Transitional, 
Transitory and Incidental Provisions and Revocation) Order 2010. 
83
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [87] – [94]. 
84
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [95]. 
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Equality and Human Rights Commission Code of Practice on Employment, which 
held that post-termination victimisation would be covered under the victimisation 
provisions (although it wrongly references readers to the definition rather than the 
prohibited act).
85
  However, unlike as in Rowstock, that EAT did not have the 
advantage of written and oral submissions on behalf of the Commission itself, 
submissions which in Rowstock were described as “a tour de force [which] amply 
developed every aspect of the point that could possibly have been deployed in support 
of the [unsuccessful] appeal”.86  Given their views on national interpretation, the EAT 
in Akwiwu found that there was no need to resort to the European obligation but in 
five short paragraphs concluded that even if they were wrong on the national 
interpretation, the ambiguity would allow a Marleasing purposive approach (the 
purpose being to prohibit discrimination in many contexts).
87
  Such an interpretation – 
peremptorily dismissing the consideration in Rowstock but noting both the difficulty 
and that the argument put forward in the cases differed – nevertheless, on its own 
terms, does not go as far as that taken in Attridge.   
 
                                                 
85
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [97].  The Explanatory Notes to the 
Equality Act 2010 similarly holds with regard to s.108 that “if the treatment which is being challenged 
constitutes victimisation, it will be dealt with under the victimisation provisions and not under this 
section” (para 353).  In the appeal in Rowstock, Underhill LJ doubted the admissibility of the code but 
noted the weight of the explanatory notes ([2014] ICR 550, note 5). 
86
 Rowstock v Jessemey [2012] UKEAT 0112_12_0503 at [14]. 
87
 Akwiwu & Anor v Onu [2013] UKEAT 0283_12_0105 at [101] – [105]. 
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When Rowstock went to the Court of Appeal, Underhill LJ, giving the judgment of the 
court, relied on Marleasing to overrule the EAT (and, in contrast to Akwiwu, he 
sought to use national law as a secondary device).  Both EATs and the Court of 
Appeal were in agreement that a drafting error was the cause of the problem, but the 
EAT in Rowstock were unwilling to ignore an express provision, however accidental.  
Underhill LJ overcame this by holding that the ‘decidedly opaque’ section did not 
preclude an implication, remarking that should any future party seek to rely on it 
‘some other court can cudgel its brains about what real effect, if any, it has’.88  This 
was supported by national law concerning rectification where there had plainly been a 
drafting error,
89
 which allows reading in of words in strict circumstances: i) where the 
intended purpose is clear; ii) the draftsman and parliament inadvertently failed to give 
effect to that purpose and iii) the court could be sure about the substance (if not the 
precise words) of the provision Parliament would have made had the error been 
noticed.  As noted by the House of Lords, ‘[t]he third of these conditions is of crucial 
importance… Otherwise any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment 
would cross the boundary between construction and legislation’.90  Neither the Court 
of Appeal in Rowstock nor the EAT in Awiwu considered the effect of the ECJ’s 
decision in Kücükdeveci v Swedex GMBH
91
 which could have provided authority to 
disapply measures which conflict with a general principle of EU law (only the EAT in 
                                                 
88
 Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014]  ICR 550, [45] – [49]. 
89
 Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586. 
90
 Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, 592. 
91
 [2010] IRLR 346. 
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Rowstock mentioned the case).
92
   Even if they had, the implication concerning post-
employment victimisation in the cases – which could be holding that victimisation fell 
within discrimination for the purposes of s.108 or to quote Underhill LJ ‘more 
elaborately by a new sub-section (2A) which follows the form of sub-sections (1) or 
(2) but refers to victimisation rather than discrimination/harassment’– is less extreme 
than that performed in Attridge given the accepted drafting error.  In any case, it 
leaves the legislation in an unsatisfactory state. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a clear divergence of practice among judges in discrimination cases as to the 
extent of the obligation to interpret, with Underhill LJ showing a tendency to insert 
subsections and having, in Attridge, seemingly pushed the obligation to breaking point 
and on to judicial legislation.  It is a far cry from reading in a phrase to prevent a 
provision from being easily evadable as in in Litster to the reading in of a discrete 
concept against the intention of Parliament.  Burton J and Laws LJ, beforehand, 
declined to go so far (and were lightly dismissed in Attridge) and subsequent cases, 
including those heard by Lady Smith (now President of Scottish Tribunals) and 
                                                 
92
 Lord Mance, in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63, preferred the phrasing 
‘discontinue, disregard or set aside measures’ where general principles of EU law were in play [61]-
[62].  The nature and effects of Kücükdeveci were and are not clear (see e.g. S. Pears (2010); R. 
Clayton and C. Murphy (2014); E. Frantziou (2014); but it is likely to have disapplying effect rather 
than inserting new law (disapplication was accepted in principle by Langstaff J in Innospec Ltd & Ors 
v Walker [2014] ICR 645 [58]-[59] but not applied as, at the material time, the right in question did not 
fall within the scope of EU law). 
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course. 
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Underhill LJ himself, have taken a less radical approach, in the latter case in content if 
not in form.   
 
While it is often clearly appropriate and efficient for national courts to interpret law to 
achieve an EU-compliant construction, there is, as illustrated by recent cases, a line 
beyond which it is better, more comprehensible and more comprehensive for 
compliance to be achieved through legislative action (and possibly Commission 
intervention
93
) than through juridicial contortion.   
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